Juicy Fields «has all the hallmarks of the Russian mafia» and has probably offloaded «no less than 500 million euros».»

The fallout from Juicy Fields' bankruptcy has continued to unfold at a dizzying pace ever since investors complained that they could not access their funds in mid-July.

Although there may never be a complete explanation of what happened within the company—and, more importantly, of what happened to the investors’ funds—a clear picture of the scale and sophistication of this scam is now beginning to emerge.

A lawyer specializing in this type of scam, who is currently organizing a class-action lawsuit on behalf of hundreds of Juicy Fields investors, believes it is «by far the biggest scam in Europe in many, many years,» one that bears all the hallmarks of the Russian mafia and could result in losses of more than 700 million euros.

This rapidly evolving picture, in addition to revealing the scale of the fraud, exposes a much broader network of complicity involving individuals, companies, and key financial institutions that enabled it to take place.

The Scam

Lars Olofsson, CEO of the Swedish legal, investment, and business management firm PRIO Startup, has as reported to BusinessCann that since a client asked him about Juicy Fields three weeks ago, he has spoken with more than 1,500 investors «in one way or another.».

Lars Olofsson’s company, which filed a class-action lawsuit, has «specialized in this type of fraud» for more than ten years and is currently working on a number of similar cases, including the micropayment platform Plipp, the telemarketing company Koncepta, and the weight-loss device seller Victus Medical.

Last week, based on the number of investors who had contacted him and the more than 500 bank transfers he had seen, Lars Olofsson estimated that approximately 30,000 people had lost money with Juicy Fields, investing an average of between 10,000 and 12,000 euros.

A few days later, following a new influx of affected investors, this estimate was raised to 120,000 people worldwide, with most of the new victims having invested an average of 40,000 euros.

«It’s absolutely mind-boggling—and we’re seasoned lawyers who’ve seen it all,» he said.

He pointed out that these figures were based solely on the bank transfer records he had seen, and therefore did not take into account the thousands of investors who had also lost bitcoins, adding that «the average crypto investor has (invested) twice as much as the cash payments.».

Taking these figures together, he estimates that investors are likely to have lost more than 700 million euros in investments, adding that the amount was «no less than 500 million euros.».

While the scale of the losses may come as a surprise, Lars Olofsson says that the fact that Juicy Fields turned out to be a scam is no surprise.

«When I look at the business model—the seeds, the cultivation, and the sale of these plants to the pharmaceutical industry—it doesn’t add up—the numbers just don’t work out. And then, when I look deeper into the setup, it has all the hallmarks of a scam.».

All the Distinctive Traits of the Russian Mafia

More specifically, Lars Olofsson asserts that, in his view, this case is «100 %» the work of the Russian mafia and bears all the hallmarks of it.

First of all, a common theme in Russian mafia scams is the sudden disappearance of the company—including its websites, phone lines, email addresses, and social media accounts—all of which are well documented in the aftermath of the Juicy Field case.

However—and this is crucial—they «leave behind people who continue to post on various social media platforms,» informing investors that there have been temporary issues or technical difficulties and that their money will soon be returned to them.

«They try to make people believe they haven’t been scammed, that there are still people who respond and say reassuring things. That’s one of the clever tricks of the scam.».

In addition to various messages sent to investors via social media over the past few weeks, Juicy Fields has has been in contact with investors over the past few days in an attempt to further cover their tracks.

The company's statement reiterates that the allegation that Juicy Fields is a Ponzi scheme «could not be further from the truth,» and that the fallout is the work of a dishonest individual, Friederich Graf von Luxburg.

Lars Olofsson says that this statement, released on July 28, is almost a «copy-and-paste of the announcements made in two other cases we handled.».

These repeated messages also serve to sow the seeds of «reasonable doubt» among prosecutors that there was «good intent, but someone defrauded» the investors.

Another key indicator of the Russian mafia’s involvement is Juicy Fields’ connection to Cyprus, where, according to an interview with the Spanish online newspaper elDiario.es in May of this year, the company had a bank account.

Cyprus is reportedly the «preferred offshore destination in Europe» for investments by the Russian mafia and oligarchs, according to a BBC report published earlier this year, which refers to the island as the «Mediterranean Moscow.».

The leaked documents, which are now readily available in various Juicy Fields Telegram groups, also suggest that Paul Bergolts, Alex Vaimer, and Vasily Kandinski—who, according to former CEO Alan Glanse, were the ones controlling the network—all held Russian passports.

However, according to Lars Olofsson, it is unlikely that these three individuals were anything more than low-level operatives in the system and that they had little to do with the planning of the operation.

Who is an accomplice?

The class-action lawsuit, which is still in the investigative stage, will aim to hold those complicit in the fraud accountable, rather than to recover the lost funds that were deposited into the Cypriot bank account.

«That money has disappeared. It’s more or less impossible to know where it ended up and how it was distributed,» explained Lars Olofsson, adding that it is very rare for the actual perpetrators of such sophisticated scams to be arrested, tried, and put behind bars.

Instead, he targets the «facilitators»—the individuals, companies, and institutions that helped Juicy Fields «directly or indirectly, as well as those who simply turned their backs and looked the other way.».

«I want to describe the environment in which this kind of scam and this kind of scheme can work. There are people and companies who should have spoken up, who should have said that this wasn’t right.»

«I can’t list them all yet. But I’d say I’d be surprised if there were fewer than 20 different types of people in key positions, companies, and so on. My goal is to show how this scam could actually be carried out—because there are so many people involved, either directly or indirectly.»

Although many key figures, including the two former CEOs, Alan Glanse and Willie van der Merwe, have issued statements in which they claimed innocence or general ignorance of what was actually happening at Juicy Fields, Lars Olofsson believes that anyone «working for or representing» the company must have known that it was a fraudulent enterprise.

BusinessCann contacted a number of organizations with which Juicy Fields claims to be affiliated or with which it has signed sponsorship agreements.

While many companies listed on the Juicy Fields website have issued statements distancing themselves from the company—including Canna Healing and Sabores Púrpura—only Kannabyte had responded to this request for comment as of this writing.

A company spokesperson stated that Kannabyte «had a business relationship with Juicy Fields,» under which it paid in advance for the cultivation of 500 medical cannabis plants and then took on the task of finding a buyer who could legally purchase the flower in Colombia.

«Simply put, Juicy Fields essentially acted as a broker,» they added, noting that they held no stake in Juicy Fields and vice versa.

When asked whether the company had reason to suspect Juicy Fields of fraud, Kannabyte replied that its due diligence procedures regarding money laundering and know-your-customer requirements had not revealed any red flag.

Most importantly, she cites «several credible cannabis conferences around the world»—including ICBC, Mary Jane Berlin Expo, Kannasur, PTMC, and many others—that have counted Juicy Fields among their sponsors as a key reason not to «doubt their credibility .».

«Kannabyte has suffered financially as a result of the Juicy Fields situation. We have outstanding invoices from Juicy Fields that haven’t been paid and that, at this point, will likely remain unpaid.»

«In addition, the events unfolding at Juicy Fields have demanded a tremendous amount of time and resources from Kannabyte’s management as we try to understand exactly what happened, what the next legal steps against Juicy Fields are, and as we strive to be as responsive as possible to our community, which wants more information and, like Kannabyte, is trying to understand exactly what happened at Juicy Fields.»

Banks

While Lars Olofsson says he aims to hold accountable all those who «looked the other way and turned a blind eye,» his immediate target will be the banks.

He said, «Banks are the main facilitators of this scam. There are also a number of other facilitators, whether individuals or companies. But my primary target—the low-hanging fruit, from my perspective as a lawyer—is undoubtedly the banks.»

He is convinced that the security infrastructure used by international financial institutions to detect suspicious activity should have flagged Juicy Fields and prevented many of these transactions from taking place.

Since most of the transactions with Juicy Fields took place across borders, three banks were involved in each one: the sending bank, the transferring bank, and the receiving bank.

According to Lars Olofsson, these banks have a system for «monitoring and evaluating these payments,» which uses complex and sophisticated algorithms designed to flag any suspicious activity.

As soon as suspicious activity is detected, these banks are required to file a suspicious activity report (SAR) with their local government’s financial regulatory authority. An average bank files hundreds of thousands of these reports each year, which gives an idea of how sophisticated this system is.

Based on the documents to which he has access, Lars Olofsson estimates that approximately 95% of Juicy Fields« transactions went through this system, but that »perhaps no more than 2%” should have been approved.

«Based on my experience—and I specialize in international regulations and compliance—98% or 99% codes for all transactions should have been flagged by this security system.»

«That's why I need as much data as possible from all investors. I try to find a specific transaction, then I'll track that transaction in the system to see if it was flagged as suspicious activity—and why a SARS report wasn't filed.»